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Don't Fear Carnivore:
It Won't Devour Individual Privacy
ThomasR. McCarlhy*
I. INTRODUCTION

A federal law enforcement agent in a small town is investigating a suspected
terrorist cell operating within the United States.' He has no real leads until an
informant2 tips him off that the terrorist cell is planning to commit a terrorist act
somewhere during the upcoming weekend. The informant does notkuow when or
where, but the informant does know that the local head of the terrorist cell
communicates with his fellow terrorists via electronic mail ("e-mail') and instant
messaging. The informant reveals that the head ofthe cell has an accountwith the
United States-based Internet service provider ("ISP") GoNet, his user name is
Terror, and his e-mail address is terror@gonet.com. The law enforcement agent
immediately contacts the system administrator at GoNet and asks the
administrator forpermission to search and seize the e-mail and instantnressaging
traffic recently sent from Terror's account' Upon advice from GoNer's counsel,
the GoNet administrator refuses to consent to the search and seizure of the traffic
from Terror's account As with all of its users, GoNet has a privacy agreement
with Terror, which states that GoNet will not disclose or disseminate information
about Terror or about Terror's Internet transmissions except inresponse to a valid
legal subpoena.4 The law enforcement agent issues a subpoena to GoNet, ordering

* Law Clerk to the Honorable Frank W. Bullock, Jr., United States District Judge
for the Middle District of North Carolina. B.S., University of Notre Dame 1995; J.D.,
George Mason University School of Law 2001. The views expressed herein do not
necessarily reflect those of Judge Bullock. The Author would like to thank Christian
Genetski, Richard Salgado, Wiliam Consovoy, and especially Rachel Reda for their
helpful comments on earlier drafts.
1. Investigations following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United
States have "exposed the rough outlines ofat least a half-dozen centers ofterrorist support
on U.S. soil operating underground." Associated Press, TerroristsMay Have Support
Among Us, NEWS & REcORD (Greensboro), Nov. 18, 2001, at Al.
2. Note that an informant's tip can be used to establish probable cause. See
generallyIllinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,231-39 (1983). Such tips are judged under a
totality of the circumstances test, through which the court will look to the informant's
veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge. Id. No one factor is dispositive; all are
relevant to the always-fluid concept of probable cause. Id.
3. In order to obtain retrieved or fresh, unretrieved e-mail communications, law
enforcement officials must comply with the Stored Wire and Electronic Communications
and Transactional Access Act. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-27 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
4. The typical privacyagreementincludes a similar provision. See STARPOWER,
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GoNet to produce the transactional information associated with and the contents
of Terror's recent e-mail and instant messaging communications. The subpoena
further orders GoNet to transmit Terror's future communications to law
enforcement in real time. GoNet cannot comply fully with the subpoena because
it does not have the technical capabilities to relay the possibly time-sensitive email information quickly to law enforcement. What can the law enforcement
agent do?
Enter Carnivore,5 the software created by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
("FBr') that functions as a cyberwiretap. The FBI states that "Carnivore is
software ... designed to capture network traffic ...

and save that traffic to a

medium."6

storage
The Department of Justice ("DOJ") believes that Carnivore
is a necessary tool for law enforcement to combat the increasing number of
everyday crimes that are "migrating to the Internet." Investigating and "tracking

Internet Access Agreement ("STARPOWER reserves the right under appropriate
circumstances to disclose the identity of a subscriber to third parties in response to a valid
legal subpoena and to otherwise cooperate with legitimate police inquiries and lawful
civil proceedings."), at http://www.starpower.net/services/internet/agreement.html (last
visited Nov. 13, 2001).
5. In early 2001, the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") changed the name
Carnivore to DCS1000 because the FBI feared that the "name Carnivore contributed to
some perceptions that the application was a predatory program that could invade citizens'
privacy." Matt MeLaughlin, FBI's Upgrade ofCarnivoreIncludes aNew Name, GOV'T
COMPUTER
NEWS
(Feb.
12,
2001),
at
http://www.gcn.com/voll-nol/daily-updates/3661-1.htnl. The Author will continue to
use the name Carnivore.
6. Electronic Privacy Information Center, CarnivoreFOJA Documents: Purpose,
availableat http://www.epic.org/privacy/camivore/purpose.htnil (last visited Nov. 13,

2001). These documents were heavily redacted by the FBI before they were released to
the Electronic Privacy Information Center ("EPIC"). See generally Electronic Privacy
Information Center, Carnivore FOIA Documents [hereinafter Carnivore FOIA
Documents], available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/carnivore/foia-documents.html

(lastvisited Nov. 13, 2001). David Sobel, an attorney for EPIC, "said that the [EPIC]
intends to challenge the FBI's editing of the released documents." Kevin Poulsen,
Carnivore Details Emerge, SECURITYFOCUS (Oct. 4, 2000), at
http://www.securityfocus.com/news/97.
7. See Deputy Assistant Attorney General Kevin V. Di Gregory, "Carnivore" and
the Fourth Amendment, Statement Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the
House Committee on the Judiciary (July 24,2000) [hereinafter Di Gregory Statement I],
availableathttp:/Iwww.usdoj.gov/cfininalcybercrimeanivore.htm" Morerecently, in
the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, the
government has sought to use Carnivore as a means to fight terrorism. See, e.g., Uniting
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Interrupt and
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,115 Stat. 272
(2001) (to be codified in scattered sections of 18, 47, & 50 U.S.C.).
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the online criminal requires law enforcement to attempt to trace the 'electronic
trail' fronthe victimbackto the perpetrator. In effect, this 'electronic trail' is the
fingerprint of the twenty-first century-only much harder to find and not as
permanent as its traditional predecessor."' The DOJ stated that the nation's
"vulnerability to computer crime is astonishingly high and threatens not only our
financial well-being and our privacy, but also [our] critical infrastructure.
Testimony before Congress demonstrates the DOJ's belief that Carnivore is
necessary for law enforcement to conduct the type of investigation required to
make the Internet safe:
[W]e have found that, at times, the Internet service provider has been
unable or even unwilling to [comply with a request for information].
Law enforcement cannot abdicate its responsibility to protect public
safety simply because technology has changed. Rather, the public
rightfully expects that law enforcement will continue to be effective..
. If the Internet service provider can comply with [a lawful court]
order ... we will not employ Carnivore. If, however, the service
provider is unwilling or unable to comply with the order, we cannot
simply give a criminal a free pass. It is for that narrow set of facts that
the FBI designed Carnivore." °
The DOJ believes that it can utilize Carnivore in a way that respects individual
privacy." However, electronic freedom activists and privacy groups, such as the
Electronic Privacy Information Center ("EPIC") and the American Civil Liberties
Union ("ACLU"), believe that Carnivore is an "excessive intrusion on individual

privacy."' 2 Both groups filed Freedom of InformationAct requests with the FBI

8. Di Gregory Statement I, supranote 7.
9. Di Gregory Statement I, supra note 7. Deputy Assistant Attorney General Di
Gregory attributed this remark to Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder. Di Gregory
Statement I, supra note 7.
10. Di Gregory Statement I, supranote 7.
11. See DeputyAssistantAttomey General Kevin V. Di Gregory, The "Carnivore"
Controversy. Electronic Surveillance and Privacy in the Digital Age, Statement Before
the Senate Committee onthe Judiciary (Sept 6,2000) [hereinafterDi Gregory Statement
11] (noting the "numerous mechanisms in place to prevent possible misuse of electronic
surveillance"), availableathttp://www.usdoj.gov/criminallcybercrimelkvd.9O6b.htm.
12. Richard Stenger, UniversitiesDecline to Review FBI's 'Carnivore'System:
Agency's Restrictions Seen as Overbearing (Sept. 6, 2000), at

http://www4.cncem/2000IECH/computingO9/O6CamivorerimdeLhtmL American
Civil Liberties Union CACLU ) Associate Director Barry Steinhardt has referred to
Carnivore as a "mass invasion ofthe privacy of law-abiding Americans." Press Release,
ACLU, ACLU Says Government Stacked Deck in Selection of Team to Review
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inthe summer of 2000, seeking all agencyrecords relating to Carnivore, including
the Carnivore object code, because these groups believe that Carnivore violates
individual privacy."3 In addition, some groups contend that Carnivore does not
even work properly. 4 Earthlink, Inc., an Atlanta-based ISP, recently reached an
agreement with the FBI that allows Earthlink to avoid future use of Carnivore."
Prior to this agreement, the FBI's use of Carnivore on Earthlink's systems caused
some Eartlilink servers to crash, disrupting Internet access for several Earthlink
16
customers.
The incident with Earthlink and the uproar from privacy groups led former
Attorney General Janet Reno to call for "an independent technical review of
Carnivore to evaluate whether it performs the functions it was designed to
perform, and does so without any greater threat to privacy or to the smooth
operation of private service providers."17 The DOJ contracted with the Illinois
Institute of Technology and the Illinois Institute of Technology Chicago-Kent
College of Law ("ITRI') to perform this independent technical review, and a
draftreport of thereviewwas released onNovember 17,2000.18 Althoughmany

"Carnivore" Cyber-tapping System (Oct. 4,2000) [hereinafter Press Release, Government
Stacked Deck], availableat http://www.aclu.org/news/2000/nl00400.html. Since the
advent of the Internet age, civil libertarians have feared government intrusion into
individual privacy. See Raphael Winick, Searches and Seizures of Computers and
ComputerData,8 HARV. J.L. & TEcH. 75,76 (1994) CAmericans' growing reliance on
computers has vastly increased the potential for the government to use electronic
surveillance to intrude into its citizens' private lives.").
13. See, e.g., Press Release, ACLU, In Unique Tactic, ACLU Seeks FBI Computer
Code On "Carnivore" and Other Cybersnoop Programs (July 14, 2000) [hereinafter Press
Release, Unique Tactic], available at http://www.aclu.org/news/2000/n071400a.htrnl.

The documents that EPIC received from the FBI pursuant to its Freedom of Information
Act ("FOIA") request are available online. See Carnivore FOIA Documents, supranote
6.
14. See, e.g., Patricia Fusco, The Appetite of Carnivore, at http://www.ispplanet.corn/politics/camivore.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2001).
15. Associated Press, EarthlinkDodgesFBI's Carnivore,USA TODAY, July 14,

2000, available at http://www.usatoday.com/life/yber/tech/cti231.htm.
16. Id.
17. See Di Gregory Statement II, supra note 11.
18. See IT RESEARCH INsTrrUTE, INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL REVIEW OF THE
CARNwvORI SYSTEM, DRAFT REPORT, at vii (Nov. 17, 2000) [hereinafter IITRI DRAFT
REPORT], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/publications/camivoredraft-l.pdf.

Several privacy groups attackedthe Department ofJustice's ("DOJ's") selection of IITRI,
arguing that this group was not "independent." See Press Release, Government Stacked

Deck, supranote 12. The ACLU called the group "biased." Press Release, Government
Stacked Deck, supra note 12. The report of the review team was to be "made public to
the maximum extent that is consistent with otherwise applicable law or contractual
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details of this review were kept secret to preserve Carnivore's effectiveness as a
tool of law enforcement, enough knowledge about Carnivore is available to
determine whether itrepresents the potential "mass invasion of the privacy oflawabiding Americans" that privacy groups fear." Law enforcement officials
recognize the importance of respecting individual privacy, but they note that the

ability to apprehend Internet criminals is necessary to protect individual freedom,
as well:
If law enforcement fails properly to respect individual privacy in its
investigative techniques, the public's confidence in government will be
eroded, evidencewillbe suppressed, and criminals will elude successful
prosecution. If law enforcement is too timid in responding to
cybercrime, however, we will, in effect, render cyberspace a safe haven
for criminals and terrorists to communicate and carry out crime, without
fear of authorized government surveillance. If we fail to make the
Internet safe, people's confidence in using the Internet and e-commerce
will decline, endangering the very benefits brought by the Information
Age. Proper balance is the key °
This "proper balance" is the center of the debate between privacy groups and

those who support the strengthening of law enforcement. The volume of the
debate only has risen in the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on
the United States. Determining whether Carnivore will be able to strike a "proper
balance" between the government's respect for individual privacy and its ability
to protect freedom requires a description of what Carnivore is and of what it is
capable."
Part II of this Article is a description of the Carnivore program, its
development, its known uses, and its safeguards against misuse.2 Part III is an
explanation oftherelevant law that governs electronic surveillance and individual
privacy.' This explanation begins with a discussion of the Fourth Amendment

obligations and with preserving the continued effectiveness of the softvare as a law
enforcement tool." Di Gregory Statement II, supranote 11.
19. See Press Release, Government Stacked Deck, supranote 12.
20. Di Gregory Statement I, supra note 7.
21. To date, there is still some information about Carnivore (most notably, its
source code) that has been withheld from the public in order to preserve Carnivore's
effectiveness as a law enforcement tool See supratext accompanying note 19. Upon
conclusion ofits review of Carnivore, the FRI actuallyrecommended thattheFBI'work
toward public release of Carnivore source code." IITRI DRAFT REPORT, supranote 18,
at xv.

22. See infra notes 26-82 and accompanying text.
23. See infranotes 83-147 and accompanying text.
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and includes a discussion of applicable statutory law. Part IV is an analysis of
Carnivore's effectiveness as a tool of law enforcement balanced against its
compliance with the law respecting individual privacy. 4 Part V concludes that
Carnivore fills an important need of law enforcement while complying the Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence and statutory protections of individual liberties."
II. WHAT IS CARNIVORE?
Public opinion of Carnivore varies greatly. Depending upon the particular
opinion, Carnivore may be either a system used to implement lawful "court' or a "cyb ersnoop" 27program
ordered surveillance of electronic communication"26
"running out of a black box!' that constitutes an "excessive intrusion on
'
individual privacy."29
While many have an opinion about Carnivore, until
recently, not much actual information has been available about the program. As
requested by former Attorney General Janet Reno, an independent technical
review of the program was conducted and a draft report made available
information about Carnivore heretofore unknown by the general public.3"
A. Carnivore: The Programand Its Development
The FBI's electronic surveillance tool now known as Carnivore began as a
different FBI project under a still-secret name sometime in the mid-1990s. " The
FBI shut this original proj ect down due to designproblems and began development
of a project called Omnivore in February of 1997.32 By the end of October of that
year, the first Omnivore prototypes were ready for field testing on Sun's Solaris
operating system.33 During this development and testing stage, the FBI deployed
Omnivore in several emergency situations. 4
In September of 1998, the FBI network surveillance lab in Quantico,
Virginia, launched a project called "Phiple Treonix" to transfer Omnivore from
the Solaris system to a Windows NT platform in order, among other things, to

24. See infra notes 148-64 and accompanying text.

25. See infra notes 165-68 and accompanying text.
26. IITRI DRAFT REPoRT, supranote 18, at viii.
27. Press Release, Unique Tactic, supranote 13.

28. Press Release, Unique Tactic, supranote 13.
29. Stenger, supra note 12.

30. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
31. See Poulsen, supra note 6. The "secret" name is redacted from the documents
produced to EPIC pursuant to its FOIA request. See Poulsen, supranote 6.
32. See Poulsen, supra note 6.
33. See Poulsen, supra note 6.
34. See Poulsen, supra note 6.
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"facilitate the miniaturization of the system and support a wide range of personal
computer (PC) equipment.' 35 The "Phiple Treonix" project produced the first
official version of Carnivore." This first official version was released in
September of 1999 as version 1.2."
Carnivore has undergone a series of tests and modifications since itwas first
released. In May of 2000, Carnivore was inversion 1.3.4.3 At that point, ithad
performed positively in several tests at the FBI network surveillance lab; the FBI
reported that "Carnivore is remarkably tolerant of network aberration[s], such as
speed change, data corruption and targeted smurf attacks."
MTRI
noted that
"Carnivore is [continuously] evolving to improve its performance, enhance its
capabilities, and keep pace with Internet development and court rulings."'
Version 1.3.4 is the most current usable version of Carnivore, and it is the
version that ITRI recently reviewed. 4 TRI defines Carnivore as "a softwarebased tool used to examine all Internet Protocol (IP) packets on an Ethernet and
record only those packets or packet segments that meet very specific
parameters."4 It is a "sniffer that can select and record a defined subset of the
traffic on the network to which it is attached.' 3 IITRI stated that the Carnivore
architecture "comprises: (1) a one-way tap into an Ethernet data stream; (2) a
general purpose computer to filter and collect data; (3) additional general purpose
computers to control the collection and examine the data; and (4) a telephone link
to the collection computer.144 The one-way tap allows Carnivore to collect data

35. Poulsen, supranote6. The otherreasons for the transferfromthe Solaris to the
Windows system were redacted from documents received by EPIC pursuant to its FOIA
request See Poulsen, supranote 6.
36. See Poulsen, supranote 6.
37. Carnivore FOIA Documents, supranote 6.
38. See Electronic InformationPrivacy Center, Carnivore FOA Documents: Test
ReportofJune2000, availableathttp:lwvw.epic.orgprivacylcamivoreltest 6_OO.hlm
(last visited Nov. 13, 2001).
39. Id. A smurf attack is an attack inwhich a computer hacker creates a computer
program that "sends out an ICMP [Internet Control Message Protocol] echo request
packet... to a computer network with the return IP address of the targeted victim. The
network's server broadcasts the [echo request packet] through the system's network and
the computers send a reply back. If the network is large enough, those [reply] packets
will swamp the victim's computer andpossibly bring the computerdown." EricJ. Sinrod
& WilliamP. Reilly, Cyber Crimes: A PracticalApproachto theApplicationofFederal
ComputerCrimeLaws, 16 SANTACLARACOMPUIER&HIGHTEC-LL.J. 177,194(2000).
40. IITRI DRAFr REPORT, supranote 18, at vii-iii.
41. See generallyUTRI Draft Report, supranote 18, at 2-1 to 2-2.
42. IITRI DRAFT REPORT, supranote 18, at vii.
43. IIT DRAFT REPORT, supranote18, at 1-1.
44. I=IRI DRAFT REPORT, supranote 18, at viii.
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but "ensures that Carnivore cannot transmit data on the network."' 45 Currently,
Carnivore simply stores the collected data as raw packets. 6 It requires a separate
post-processing program called "Packeteer" to process "the raw output of
Carnivore to reconstruct higher-level protocols from IP packets. '4' Another postprocessing program called CoolMiner uses Packeteer's output to "develop
statistical summaries and displays either pen-register or full content information
via an Internet browser."48 Carnivore can operate so that it selectively targets a
certain subset of Internet traffic on a system. It can select a target "based on IP
address, protocol, or, in the case of e-mail, on the user names in the TO and
'
FROM fields."49
In limited cases, it also can target certain data based on
0
content." Carnivore has two modes for collecting data: (1) full mode, in which
data packets can be recorded in their entirety, and (2) pen mode, in which
recording is limited to addressing information. 1 The FBI has used Carnivore in
one or both of these modes at least twenty-five times, including in ten national
security cases and six domestic criminal cases in 2000.2
B. Carnivore'sPrimary Uses
The FBI utilizes Carnivore to collect two kinds of data. In pen mode, it
collects addressing information under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-27," and in full mode,
it collects the full content of communications under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22.'
1. Pen Mode: Obtaining Addressing Information
The FBI can use Carnivore to obtain the addressing information (sometimes
referred to as transactional information) associated with Internet activity. The FBI
refers to this as pen mode, in reference to pen registers, which are devices that

45.
46.
47.
48.

IITRI DRAFT REPORT, supra note 18, at ix.
See Poulsen, supranote 6.
IITRI DRAFT REPORT, supranote 18, at xii; see also Poulsen, supra note 6.
IITRI DRAFT REPORT, supra note 18, at xii; see also Poulsen, supra note 6.

The FBI refers to Carnivore, Packeteer, and CoolMiner, collectively, as the "DragonWare
suite." See IITRI DRAFT REPORT, supranote 18, at xii; see also Poulsen, supranote 6.
Unless otherwise indicated, the Authorrefers to the entire softwarepackage as Carnivore,

as is the common usage.
49. IITRI DRAFT REPORT, supranote 18, at 1-1.
50. See ITRI DRAFT REPORT, supranote 18, at 1-1.

51. See I1TRI DRAFT REPORT, supranote 18, at 1-1.
52. See Associated Press, Reno Plans Study of FBI's "Carnivore" (Aug. 10,
2000), availableat http://www.aclu.org/news/2000/w081000a.htnl.
53. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-27 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
54. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
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recordthenumbers dialed from a telephone. 5 The label "penmode" suggests that
the FBI believes that obtaining addressing information is essentially the same as
obtaining phone numbers via a pen register. The similarity is apparent-in both
situations, law enforcement simply obtains the information necessary to make a
communications connection. In pen mode, the FBI can use Carnivore to obtain
"the TO and FROM e-mail addresses and the IP addresses of computers involved
in File Transfer Protocol (FTP) and Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTIP)
sessions.""

2. Full Mode: Obtaining the Content of Real-Time Communications
In addition to pen mode, Carnivore also has a full mode of operation. When
utilizing Carnivore's full mode, the FBI can obtain the actual content ofreal-time
communications.57
The fact that Carnivore can intercept real-time
communications is significant because the nation's legal system provides more
protection for real-time electronic communications than it does for stored
electronic communications." In full mode, the FBI can "view the content of email messages, HTTP pages, [and] FTP sessions."59
3. "Grabbing" Extra Information
Contrary to some public opinion and the concern of privacy advocates,
Carnivore does not"grab" information other than its intended target information. '
Carnivore has a filtering system that allows the program to collect information
from onlyits intended target.6 ' It does not "read all incoming and outgoing e-mail

55. Pen registers record the numbers dialed from a telephone-the outgoing
numbers. See 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). Penregisters are similarto
trap and trace devices, except that trap and trace devices record the "originating"
numbers, or incoming numbers, dialed from a telephone to the phone on which the trap
and trace device is attached. See 18 U.S.C. § 3127(4) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
56. TRI DRAFT REPORT, supranote 18, at ix.
57. See ITR DRAFT REPORT, supranote 18, at 1-1.
58. See generallySteve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 816 F. Supp. 432
(W.D. Tex. 1993),aff'd,36F.3d457(5thCir. 1994). Note also thatthe Stored Wire and
Electronic Communications and Transactional Records Access Act, ubichgowems access
to stored communications, provides no suppressionremedyforviolations ofitsprovisions.
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-11 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
59. ITRI DRAFT REPORT, supra note 18, at ix.
60. In pen mode, Carnivore does indicate the length of messages; however, it
reveals no content of the communications. See ilTRI DRAFT REPORT, supranote 18, at
xii
61. IITRI DRAFT REPORT, supra note 18, at xii-diiL
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messages" or "monitor the web-surfing habits and downloading habits of all [an]
ISP's customers."'62 It only stores data packets for later analysis "after they are
positively linked by the filter settings to a target."'63 In fact, HTRI found that "in
order to work effectively, [Carnivore] must reject the majority of packets it
monitors."' Furthermore, in the few cases where IITRI tests found differences
between the targeted data and the output retrieved and reproduced by the
Packeteer and CoolMiner programs, these differences were attributable to bugs
in the Packeteer and CoolMiner software.65 Subsequent IITRI examination ofthe
corresponding raw Carnivore data revealed that the targeted data were in fact
collected correctly.'
C. Carnivore'sSafeguardsAgainst Misuse67
The FBI plans to use Carnivore in only limited circumstances---"when other
implementations (e.g., having an ISP provide the requested data) do not meet the
needs of the investigators or the restrictions placed by the court."6" In these
circumstances, "[FBI] agents follow a rigorous, detailed procedure to obtain court
orders and surveillance is performed under the supervision ofthe court issuing the
'
order."69
Currently, multiple approvals are required before a court order can be
requested.7" In addition, the supervising judge can "independently verify .that
traffic collected is only what was legally authorized."'
In addition to the prerequisite court order and the requirement of supervision,
the FBI provides for separation of responsibilities among agents when operating
Carnivore. Case agents, whose incentive is to solve or prevent crimes, "establish
the need and justification for the surveillance."72 In order to remove this incentive

62. IITRI DRAFT REPORT, supranote 18, at xiii.
63. IITRI DRAFT REPORT, supranote 18, at xiii.
64. IITRI DRAFT REPORT, supra note 18, at xiii.
65. See UTRI DRAFT REPORT, supra note 18, at xii.
66. See IITRI DRAFT REPORT, supra note 18, at xii.
67. In addition to the procedural safeguards laid out by the FBI and the structural
safeguards within Carnivore, there are judicial safeguards-suppression motions, civil
litigation, and potential criminal prosecution of law enforcement agents who violate an
individual's rights. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (civil litigation);
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 898 (1984) (suppression motions); Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (civil
litigation).
68. IITRI DRAFT REPORT, supra note 18, at viii.
69. IITRI DRAFT REPORT, supra note 18, at viii.
70. See IITRI DRAFT REPORT, supranote 18, at xii.
71. IITRI DRAFT REPORT, supra note 18, at xii.
72. IITRI DRAFT REPORT, supra note 18, at viii.
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from the collection process and prevent the problem of overzealous investigation
by law enforcement agents "engaged in the often competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime,"' these case agents do not actually install the necessary
equipment and configure it for proper operatiom 4 This task is handled by a
separate team of "technically trained agents," which installs the equipment and
sets the filtering system "to restrict collection to that allowedby the court order.'fls
These agents are "motivated by FBI policy and procedures to ensure that
collection adheres strictly to court orders and will be admissible in court as
evidence." 6 FBI officials also contend that Carnivore "creates an audit trailrm
that tracks its collection activity;, however, IITRI found that these audit functions
are less than adequate.'8 Legislation enacted since the IITRI study has remedied
the inadequacy of the audit functions by requiring that information intercepted by
Carnivore be turned over to the judge who issued the order authorizing the
particular usage of Carnivore.' 9
In addition to these procedural limitations, there are structural limitations
within Carnivore that prevent misuse. As indicated above, the system utilizes a
one-way tap, which "ensures that Carnivore cannot transmit data on the
' Also, the absence of an installed protocol stack
network"SO
prevents Carnivore
from processing data packets other than to filter and record them.8 Thus,
"Carnivore canneither alter packets destined for other systems onthe network nor
initiate any packets."'

73. Johnsonv. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
74. ITRIDRAFT REPORT, supranote 18, at viii.

75. 1TRI DRAFT REPORT, supra note 18, at viii.
76. IITRI DRAFr REPORT, supra note 18, at viii. The Author notes that the
incentiveto ensure admissible evidence is not likelypresentin a penmode situation. The
Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule does not apply to pen register or trap and trace
devices as they do not constitute searches under Fourth Amendmentjurisprudence. See
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,745-46 (1979) (holding that a pen register device does
not constitute a search). For a discussion ofFourthAmendmentjurisprudence, see infra
notes 83-133 and accompanying text. Furthermore, the pen register and trap and trace
provisions ofthe Electronic Communications PrihacyAct ("ECPA") have no exclusionary
remedy to preventthe use of evidence obtained via the unauthorized use ofa pen register.
See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-27 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
77. Di Gregory Statement I, supranote 7.
78. See TRI DRAFT REPORT, supra note 18, at xii.

79. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USAPATRIOT Act) Act of2001, Pub. L.
No. 107-56, § 216, 115 Stat 272, 288-290 (2001) (to be codified in scattered sections of
18,47, & 50 U.S.C.).
80. IHTRI DRAFT REPORT, supranote 18, at ix.
81. See IITRIDAFT REPORT, supranote 18, atix.
82. ITRI DRAFT REPORT, supranote 18, at ix.
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III. GUIDING LAW AND RELEVANT LEGAL PRINCIPLES

A. FourthAmendment Jurisprudence
The right of the people to be secure in theirpersons,houses,papers
and effects, againstunreasonablesearches andseizuresshallnot be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, andparticularlydescribing the
place to be searched,and the persons or things to be seized.'
The purpose ofthe Fourth Amendment is "to preserve our individual privacy
while protecting the safety of our citizens."' Although the Fourth Amendment
protects individual privacy, this protection is not absolute. The text of the Fourth
Amendment acknowledges the legitimacy of reasonable searches.' Specifically,
the Warrant Clause authorizes warrants issued "upon probable cause." 6 The
Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment such that the Warrant
Clause is the controlling clause," and under this interpretation, the Court has
stated that searches and seizures are presumed to be unreasonable unless carried
out pursuant to a warrant.88 The Supreme Court's interpretation presents the
following question: what is a search (or seizure)? When the actions of law
enforcement constitute a search, the Fourth Amendment's protections kick in;
however, where law enforcement does not engage in a search, the Fourth
Amendment warrant protection is not triggered.'
In his concurring opinion in Katz v. UnitedStates, ° Justice Harlan outlined
the test that has been accepted as the determinant of whether a search has taken
place.91 Justice Harlan's test has both a subjective and an objective component:
"first, that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy
and, second, that
the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable."' 92 This test has come to be known as the Katz test or the

83. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
84. Di Gregory Statement I, supranote 7.
85. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
86. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.

87. See TELFORDTAYLOR,TwoSTUDIESINCONSTITnrIONALINTERPRETATION 2324 (1969).
88. See STEPHEN A. SALTZBuRG & DANmL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CIMINAL
PROCEDURE 34 (6th ed. 2000).

89. See, e.g., Smithv. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,745-46 (1979) ("[Tlhe [government
action] was not a 'search,' and no wan-ant was required.").
90. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
91. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
92. Id. (Harlan, J., concurring).
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"reasonable expectation of privacy" test. Since Katz, the Supreme Court has
applied this test to numerous situations. In instances that the Court finds that an
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy, law enforcement must obtain
a warrant before searching that place. However, where there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy, there is no search.'
1. Pen Registers
The Supreme Courthas determined that the use ofa pen register device is not
a search- 5 In Smith v. Maryland the telephone company, at police request,
installed apenregister device inphone company offices and recorded the numbers
called by the defendant from his home phone.' When the defendant used his
telephone, he "voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the [tele]phone
company." Because, under UnitedStatesv. Miller,' aperson has no legitimate
expectation ofprivacy in informationhe turns over to third parties, the defendant
had no expectation ofprivacy in the numbers he dialed.'0 The Court held that the
use of the pen register did not constitute a search;"° ' therefore, neither a warrant
nor probable cause was required.
2. Wiretaps
Early this century, the Supreme Courtheld that a wiretap was not a search."
In Olmsteadv. UnitedStates,1 Justice Taft wrote for the majority that "one who

93. Id. (Harlan, J., concurring).
94. Smith, 442 U.S. at745-46 (finding no expectation of privacy and, thus, holding
that the government action "was not a 'search").
95. Id. at 742.
96. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
97. Id. at 737.
98. Id.

99. 425 U.S. 435 (1976). InMiller,the Court found that an individual had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in bank records because these records were accessible
by another person or party. See id. at 442-43.
100. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 742.
101. See id.
102. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,466 (1928). Justice Brandeis,
dissenting in Olmstead, actually foresaw the issues relevant to the modem debate
regarding electronic surveillance: "Ways may some day be developed by which the
Govemment, without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court,
and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrence of the

home." Id.at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
103. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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installs in his house a telephone instrument with connecting wires intends to
project his voice to those quite outside." 1" Justice Taft noted that telephone
messages are not papers or effects under the Fourth Amendment and held with
regard to the wiretap: "The amendment does not forbid what was done here.
There was no searching. There was no seizure.""
Some forty years after Olmstead,the Supreme Court looked once again at
whether wiretapping constituted a search or seizure, and this time, the Court
reached a different result."° InKatz, FBI agents attached a listening device to the
outside of a public telephone booth so that they could overhear the defendant's end
of his telephone conversations." ° The agents used the information they obtained
to charge the defendant with interstate transferring of wagering information." 8
The Court held that "[t]he Government's activities in electronically listening to
and recording the petitioner's words violated the privacy upon which hejustifiably
relied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a 'search and seizure'
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."'"
3. Mail and E-mail 1
The Supreme Court has long held that letters and sealed packages sent
through the mail can be opened and examined only pursuant to a warrant. Justice
Field announced this rule in Exparte Jackson,"' noting that the "constitutional
guaranty of the right of the people to be secure in their papers against
unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their papers, thus closed against
inspection, wherever they may be." ' Althoughthis rule still stands, the Supreme
Court has allowed the detention of packages for a reasonable period of time when
the packages are of a suspicious character.1"
While the Supreme Court has had no opportunity to decide whether an
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his e-mail transmissions, this
issue has been litigated at the appellate level in the United States Court of Appeals

104. Id.
at 466.
105. Id. at 464.
106. See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
107. See id. at 348.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 353.
110. The Supreme Court has not faced the issue whether an individual has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his e-mail transmissions. The seminal e-mail case
is United States v.Maxwell,45 M.J. 406 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
111. 96 U.S. 727 (1877).

112. Id.
at 733.
113. See United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 253 (1970).
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for the Armed Forces."' In United States v. Mawell,"' the FBI obtained a
search warrant to search the files of America Online ("AOL") computers while
investigating a suspected child pornographyring." 6 The warrant did not authorize
the search of the defendant's e-mail files; nevertheless, the FBI seized all file
material relating to the defendant, a subscriber to AOL with an e-mail account." 7
The court found that the key question was whether the defendant had a
reasonable expectation ofprivacy underKatz.1 " The courtheld that the defendant
did have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his e-mail transmissions."" The
courtreasonedthatthe e-mail arrangement was quite analogous to first-class mail,
and, like first-class mail, the sender has a reasonable expectation ofprivacy until
the mail is opened by the intended recipient'2 Once opened, the "destiny of the
letter lies in the control of the recipient of the letter, not the sender.".'2' The
Maxwell court also compared e-mail to telephone communications and found that
this analogy supported the idea that e-mail should be treated similarly to telephone
communications for Fourth Amendment purposes. The court found that "the
transmitter of an e-mail message enjoys a reasonable expectation that police
officials will not intercept the transmission without probable cause and a search
warrant."" The court did note, however, that e-mail transmissions, once received
by another person, are no longer in the control of the transmitter." TheMaxwell
court's treatment of e-mail as analogous to telephone communications lends
support to the idea of treating a cyberwviretap (i.e., Carnivore) in the same way as
a telephone wiretap for Fourth Amendment purposes.

4. Plain View
Evidence of a crime may be seized without a warrant under the plain vew
exception to the warrant requirement " In Horton v.California," the Supreme
Court outlined the conditions for search or seizure to fall within the purview of the
plain view doctrine.'26 The Court held that the object's incriminating character

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

See Maxwell, 45 N.. at 406.
45 MJ.406 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
at411-14.
See id.
Seeid.at416.
See id. at418.
See id.
at419.
See id.
at 417.
Id.
at 417.
Id.
at418.
Id.
See Hortonv. California, 496 U.S. 128, 129 (1990).
496 U.S. 128 (1990).
See id. at 136-37.
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must be immediately apparent and the officer must have a lawful right of access
to the object.127
5. Exclusionary Rule
The usual remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation is the exclusion of the
evidence gathered as a result of that violation.12 In Weeks v. UnitedStates,2 the
Supreme Court held that this remedy applied in federal criminal proceedings
where the illegal searchwas conducted by federal officers. 3 The Court declined
to extend this rule to the states in Wolfv. Colorado; however, the Court later
overruled Wolf and held that the exclusionary rule applied against the states in
Mapp v. Ohio.' An important issue with regard to the exclusionary rule is that
it applies to violations of the Fourth Amendment; consequently, evidence obtained
by means other than a search is generally not excluded.'
B. Statutory Law
The FBI and the DOJ have claimed that existing statutory provisions, the pen
register and trap and trace portion of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
("ECPA") and Title mII of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968, authorize surveillance conducted via Carnivore's pen and full modes,
respectively.'34 Some commentators have questioned this claimed authority;'3"
however, such questions about authorization have been rendered moot by
legislation enacted in the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the
United States. This legislation, the Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of
2001 ("USA PATRIOT Act"), explicitly authorizes the electronic surveillance of

127. See id.
128. See SALTzBURG & CAPRA, supra note 88, at 444.
129. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
130. See id. at 398.
131. 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949).
132. 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961) ("We hold that all evidence obtained by searches
and seizures in violation of the Constitution is ...inadmissible in a state court.").
133. See Smithv. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,745-46 (1979).
134. See IlTRI DRAFT REPORT, supranote 18, at 3-1 to 3-3.
135. See Manton M. Grier, Jr., The Software FormerlyKnown as "Carnivore":
When DoesE-MailSurveillanceEncroachUpon aReasonableExpectationofPrivacy?,
52 S.C. L. REv. 875, 884-86 (2001); see also Christian Schultz, UnrestrictedFederal
Agent. "Carnivore"and the Need to Revise the PenRegisterStatute, 76 NoTRE DAME
L. REv. 1215, 1240-54 (2001).
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computer traffic through amendments to ECPA and Title M.' Thus, Carnivore
should be analyzed in light ofthe statutorybackdrop created by ECPA11"and Title
M." These statutes, as modified by the USA PATRIOT Act, provide a level of
protection not required by the Fourth Amendment" 9
1. Pen Register/Trap and Trace Statute-18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-27
Because pen registers do not constitute a search,14 they do not have to
conformto the strictures ofFourthAmendmentjurisprudence. Nevertheless, there
are some procedural requirements with which law enforcement officials must
comply in order to obtain authority to utilize a pen register (or trap and trace)
14
device. 1
In order to obtain a pen register court order, a law enforcement officer must
ertify "to the court that the information likely to be obtained by such installation
and use is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation."14 The penregister order
must specify.
(A) the identity, if known, of the person to whom is leased... the
telephone line to which the pen register... is attached; (B) the identity,
if known, of the person who is the subject of the criminal investigation;
(C) the number and, if known, physical location of the telephone line to
which the pen register... is to be attached ...
; and (D) a statement of
the offense to which the information likely to be obtained by the pen
43
register... relates.
2. Title 1U-18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22
Title ImI "places a higher burden on the real-time interception of oral, wire
and electronic communications than the Fourth Amendment requires."'" The

136. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing AppropriateTools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 10756, 115 Stat 272 (2001) (to be codified in scattered sections of 18,47, & 50 U.S.C.).
137. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-27 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
138. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
139. See Smith v.Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979); see also supranotes 83133 and accompanying text
140. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 746; see also supranotes95-101 and accompanying
text
141. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-27 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
142. 18 U.S.C. § 3123 (1994).
143. 18 U.S.C. § 3123(b)(1) (1994).
144. Di Gregory Statement I, supranote 7.
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Fourth Amendment requires a warrant for a wiretap. 4 In addition, Title III
requires law enforcement officers to obtain a court order to wiretap
communications in the absence of a statutory exception. 46 To obtain such an
order, "the government must show that normal investigative techniques for
obtaining the information have [failed] or are likely to fail or are too dangerous,
and that any interruption will be conducted so as to ensure that the intrusion is
minimized.'

1

47

IV. AN ANALYSIS OF CARNIVORE AS AN INVESTIGATIVE TOOL
AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF
LAWS DESIGNED TO PROTECT INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY
A. Effectiveness as a Law Enforcement Investigative Tool
As Internet use becomes increasingly prevalent in society, it is imperative
that law enforcement agents have an investigative tool that enables them to keep
pace with the enterprising criminals who have and will continue to utilize the
Internet as a vehicle for crime. IITRI's recent review of Carnivore indicates that
Carnivore should be up to the task. Following their independent technical review
of Carnivore, UTRI officials concluded that "Carnivore represents technology that
can be more effective in protecting privacy and enabling lawful surveillance than
can alternatives. ' 48 Carnivore places the FBI on a level playing field with
cybercriminals. Carnivore's pen and full modes of operation afford the FBI the
same or similar investigative techniques and procedures as are available to law
enforcement in the telephone context.
An important characteristic of Carnivore is that it has the capability to
perform its collection operations without posing any substantial risks to the
integrity of the ISP on whose system it resides.'49 IITRI concluded, following its
review of the program, that "Carnivore introduces no operational or security risks
to the ISP network where it is installed."' 5 °

145. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 (1967).
146. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(ii) (1994).
147. Di Gregory Statement I, supra note 7.
148. IITRI DRAFT REPORT, supra note 18, at xii.
149. IITRI DRAFT REPORT, supra note 18, at xii. This statement is undoubtedly
denied by Earthlink. See supranotes 14-16 and accompanying text.
150. 1ITRI DRAFT REPORT, supra note 18, at xii.
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B. Compliancewith IndividualPrivacyLi,

Privacy groups like EPIC and the ACLU must acknowledge the fact that law
enforcement plays a critical role in preserving privacy. Althoughprivacy groups
are correct in arguing that Carnivore is an intrusion on individual privacy, they
neglect the fact that the Fourth Amendment contemplates reasonable searches and
seizures, and even authorizes them under the Warrant Clause.
Case law and statutory law stand for the same principle with regard to pen
registers and with regard to wiretaps-pen registers are not a search; wiretaps are
a search."1 Ingeneral, Carnivore's pen and full modes appear to comply with the
applicable law regarding pen registers and wiretaps, respectively.
In order to obtain source or destination information in real time, the
governmentmust obtain a trap and trace or pen register court order authorizing the
recording of such information." 2 Thus, the FBI must (and does) obtain a court
order in order to operate Carnivore in pen mode. 3 Similarly, the government
must comply with the warrant requirement and with Title III in order to utilize a
wiretap for surveillance purposes orto search and seize letters and packages in the
mail Therefore, the FBI must do likewise when utilizing Carnivore in its full
mode, regardless of whether this fall mode is more akin to wiretapping a phone or
opening someone's mail.
This analysis still leaves a few questions to be answered. Carnivore does
record the length of messages when operating in pen mode. It does so by
collecting the number of data bytes transferred in an e-mail message and
representing each byte by an"X" in the subject field." Such information has no
real analog in the pen register context.' However, it is unlikely that "society is
prepared to recognize as 'reasonable' 6 an expectation of privacy in the length
17
of e-mail messages.
Some commentators argue that Carnivore's pen mode should be held to
stricter standards than pen registers because "e-mail addressing information is
more personal, and thus more revealing than a phone number.""' However, this
argument fails for both practical and legal reasons. Inpractice, e-mail addressing
information is not necessary personal. It is only as personal as the user chooses
itto be. On the other hand, telephone numbers generally reveal the location of the
151. See supranotes 95-109 and accompanying text.
152. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-27 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
153. See supranotes 95-109 and accompanying text.
154. ITRI DRAFT REPORT, supranote 18, at C-3.
155. The iTRI Draft Report noted that recording such data might present an issue
of"overcollectiona" UTRI DRAFT REPORT, supranote 18, at 4-2 to 4-3.
156. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
157. See Schultz, supranote 135, at 1241-42.
158. Grier, supranote 135, at 887.
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caller by area code and prefix, without any choice made by the caller. More
importantly, in legal analysis, the personal nature of an e-mail address is largely
irrelevant to the level of protection it may or may not deserve under the Fourth
Amendment. Under United States v. Miller,"9 a person has no legitimate
expectation privacy in information she turns over to third parties. Thus, the
individual who discloses her e-mail address to third parties has no legitimate
expectation of privacy in her e-mail address regardless of its personal nature.
Additionally, it is possible to put content-type information in the address
fields of an e-mail communication. Some may argue, in light of this fact, that
Carnivore's pen mode should be held to the standard of its full mode. However,
an FBI agent may have a right to search and seize content-type information in an
address field under the plain view doctrine. If the agent has a lawful court order
for a Carnivore pen mode collection of data, then that agent may have a lawful
right of access to the content-type information.160 Should the incriminating nature
of the information be readily apparent when the agent finds it in his plain view,
then the agent is authorized to obtain this information without a warrant.'
In addition to complying with the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and the
relevant statutory law, Carnivore is subject to several structural limitations and
procedural requirements that limit its potential for misuse. Nevertheless, privacy
groups fear the "overzealous" officer or the "rogue" 6 2 cop "engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." 63 However, the warrant clause is
specifically directed at preventing such behavior. " There is also a set ofjudicial
remedies available to address government violations of individual privacy (and to
act as a deterrent to such behavior).
V. CONCLUSION
In light of the relevant jurisprudence and statutory scheme, it seems that the
fears of privacy groups are unlikely to materialize. President George W. Bush
recognized as much when he signed the USA PATRIOT Act into law on October
26,2001: "This bill was carefully drafted and considered.... This bill met with
an... overwhelming agreement in Congress because it upholds and respects the
civil liberties guaranteed by our Constitution." '65 According to IITRI, Carnivore

159. 425 U.S. 325 (1976).
160. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1990).
161. Id.
162. See Grier, supranote 135, at 890.
163. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).

164. See id. at 13-14.
165. President George W. Bush, Remarks at the Signing of the USA PATRIOT Act
(Oct. 26,2001), availableat 2001 WL 1298919. The USAPATRIOTAct was approved
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performs its collection operations fairly efficiently and accurately-"[w]hen

Carnivore is used correctly under a Title III order, it provides investigators with
no more information than is permitted by a given court order."'"
Carnivore has the potential to fill a need for law enforcement-the need for
a tool that puts law enforcement on a level playing field with cybercriminals.
While Carnivore has some administrative deficiencies, it is "evolving to improve
its performance [and] enhance its capabilities." 1 If these deficiencies can be
improved, Carnivore will allow law enforcement the ability to investigate,
apprehend, and prosecute criminals in the cyberworld in the same way that it can
do so to perpetrators of traditional crimes.
Carnivore complies with the Supreme Court's current Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. It also complies with the higher standards imposed by the nation's
individualprivacy statutory scheme. The fact thatthe statutory scheme has higher
standards should be a tip to privacy groups that lobby for tighter controls on
Carnivore. If tighter controls are what they want, they should write their
representatives in Congress and lobby for stricter statutory provisions, because
Carnivore squares with both the ECPA and Title IR as supplemented bythe USA
PATRIOT Act. There is always the possibility that the InternetAge will continue
to evolve in such a way that what "society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable""'1 may change and Carnivoremaynot stand up againstfuture Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. Until then, don't fear Carnivore; it won't devour

individual privacy.

by an overwhelming margin. In the Senate, ninety-eight of ninety-nine voting Senators
supportedthe bill. See Press Release, FederalDocument Clearing House, Anti-Terrorism
Bill Easily Passes the Senate (Oct. 25, 2001), available at 2001 WIL 5422733. In
addition, the USA PATRIOT Act includes some built-in protection for civil liberties in
that it has a sunset provision, which terminates much of the bill on December 31, 2005.
See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Interrupt and Obstruct Terrorism (USAPATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
§ 224, 115 Stat 272, 295 (2001) (to be codified in scattered sections of 18, 47, & 50
U.S.C.).
166. IITRI DRAFT REPORT, supra note 18, at xii.
167. IITRI DRAFT REPORT, supranote 18, at vii.
168. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
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